Opposing American and Chinese views on navigational rights of warships in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) reached a climax in 2009 with a number of incidents. Developments in 2010 indicate that the general climate between the two States in the South China Sea has not improved. By focusing on navigational rights of warships in the EEZ as well as in the territorial sea, the present contribution highlights some salient features of the relevant ocean policies of both States, some of which seem hard to square with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. After having noted that these opposing positions of China and the United States concerning navigational rights of warships are hard to reconcile at present, the article looks for possible solutions as to the future.
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2. Instead of reacting directly to the articles which appeared in a previous issue of this Journal, 2 the present contribution will start out by emphasizing developments since the last agora to better understand the present-day general context against which this divergence of views has to be understood (Section II). Secondly, it will highlight some salient features of American and Chinese ocean policy that seem at times hard to reconcile to contemporary international law of the sea notions (Section III). Thirdly, some observations will be made with respect to arguments developed by the authors in a previous issue of this Journal (Section IV). Fourthly, an evaluation will be made of the situation as it exists at present (Section V). In the conclusions, some practicable ways forward will be suggested, drawing upon a most likely scenario as to the future interests of the parties involved (Section VI).
3. All this will be done based on a personal appreciation of the situation by the present author as a disinterested third party, based on his own attendance at international conferences on (aspects of ) the issue, as well as previously conducted research in related areas. The present contribution takes the liberty of somewhat widening the discussion to include the navigational rights of warships in the territorial sea, as reflected in its title, since all authors in the previous agora touched upon these areas as well. 4 did not arise totally out of the blue. Indeed, the opposite positions of the parties on the legal issues involved had already been clearly articulated about a year earlier by Chinese and US lawyers on the occasion of an international conference. 5 
II. General background
5. It seems fair to assume that China has blue water naval aspirations. Since the 1990s, this country has engaged in a marked expansion of its naval capabilities which has not passed unnoticed in the United States. 6 Also, China is clearly preparing itself to become a blue water power. 7 This crescendo pattern continued during the past year.
8 Some developments during 2010, not directly related to naval exercises, further corroborate this submission.
6. The planting of the Chinese flag at a depth of 3759 metres in the South China Sea during the summer of 2010 indicates that this country is capable, in a short period of time, of equalling, or even surpassing the exploits of leading countries in the construction of this kind of submersible. 9 The images of this planting of the flag at an unspecified location in the South China Sea were spread around Diaoyu/Senkaku. This triggered an action-reaction pattern which soon spiralled out of control. 16 The latter has been interpreted by a Western analyst as an affirmation of China's power in the region. 17 Japan recently reacted to these Chinese naval manifestations by redefining its defence strategy. If the main emphasis in the past had been placed on the deployment of tanks and artillery in the northern island of Hokkaido, close to the Russian mainland and the Sakhalin peninsula, for the next ten years the centre of attention will be shifted south to the Okinawa Prefecture, facing mainland China and the island of Taiwan, with a clear increase in naval capabilities. 18 As could be expected, this reorientation has been very much regretted by China. 12. The present author, for instance, was rather puzzled when attending a conference of the Law of the Sea Institute at the University of California at Berkeley in 2008. 28 As a special guest speaker John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor of the US Department of State at that time, addressed the conference participants on 3 December with the following theme: "The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention". 29 On that occasion, he opposed those critics of adherence to the LOS Convention, who claim that this would hinder US intelligence activities, by stating:
III. Salient features of US and Chinese ocean policies
For example, one of the intelligence-related assertions is that the [LOS] Convention prohibits submarines from transiting submerged through the territorial sea of a coastal State. It is true that a submarine must surface in order to enjoy the benefits of the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. What is not true is that the [LOS] Convention prohibits submerged transit through the territorial sea. Submarines are free to transit submerged; they simply aren't entitled to the benefits of the right of innocent passage if they do. These rules have prevailed for decades, including under a 1958 treaty to which the United States is already a party -a fact that was either unknown to or unacknowledged by the [LOS] Convention's critics. 30 [Emphasis in the original] 13. Such line of reasoning might well serve the purpose of trying to convince the sceptics of the LOS Convention to change sides on the internal American level, but on the international level such kind of argumentation seems awkward at United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans -such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other States in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the [LOS] Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal States. Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a world-wide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the [LOS] Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. best.
31 By analogy, one could indeed argue that surface ships can engage at libertysince it is not specifically prohibited-in any of the activities listed in Article 19, paragraph 2, of the LOS Convention while sailing through the territorial sea of another country, the only inconvenience being that if they are caught redhanded, these ships will no longer be entitled to the benefit of the right of innocent passage. If that were to be the correct interpretation, it would most probably result in much more interference with innocent passage by the coastal State, as some of the activities listed there cannot easily be ascertained by means of external observation, 32 a result clearly contrary to general US policy on the matter.
14. Moreover, this line of legal defence was, for instance, never relied upon by competent US authorities, not even as a fall-back position, when an American and a Russian submarine collided on 11 February 1992 at a depth of 20 metres in Kola Bay in front of Murmansk, where the northern fleet of the Russian Federation is stationed. Instead, the United States argued that the straight baselines drawn by the Soviet Union in the past were not in accordance with the LOS Convention, making the exact location of the incident fall outside the Russian territorial waters, whereas according to the Russians, the incident occurred 5 nautical miles inside that zone. 33 Because after this particular incident the American submarine was able to leave the area undisturbed in underwater mode in order to reach its home port, Norfolk, Virginia, the argumentation of the Legal Advisor, reprinted above, 34 would have amply sufficed as legal justification. Instead, Pentagon officials at that time went to great lengths to argue that the incident did take place in what they consider to be international waters, i.e. waters outside the Russian territorial sea. 35 15. The ocean policy of China also has certain peculiarities which at times seem hard to reconcile to certain provisions of the LOS Convention, including those 31 This may also explain why the just quoted part of Bellinger's remarks was not included in the excerpts from the Legal Advisor's speech that found their way into 45 as an identification of the latter's claim to the so enclosed maritime area as historic waters of China. 46 At a conference held a couple of months later, however, others rather emphasized what this clarification did not contain, i.e. any reference to historic title, and drew certain conclusions from this omission. 47 This duality in possible explanations of the Chinese clarification has in the mean time been picked up by the literature. 48 18. This is not the place to develop this particular issue in further detail, 49 but it will be clear that such a line on a map, depending on the exact interpretation one vn/trung-tam-du-lieu-bien-dong/doc_download/228-booklet-of-the-second-). A paper was presented, which the speaker had prepared together with Tara Davenport, titled "CLCS Submissions and Claims in the South China Sea". It is noteworthy in this respect that a Taiwanese scholar, whose government officials have at times openly endorsed the historic title claim (see, for instance, Li and Li, above n.38, 292-293), today concludes that "proclaiming sovereignty over the water area would be difficult". gives to it, can easily have serious implications for navigational freedoms for the maritime areas so enclosed. The LOS Convention does not seem to sustain such expansive claims to water areas on a historic basis.
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IV. Some observations with respect to arguments developed in the previous agora 19. One of the basic bones of contention which appeared in the previous agora was the categorization of marine data collection. Both authors take principled, yet at the same time, totally opposite positions. According to Pedrozo, a clear distinction has to be made between marine scientific research, hydrographic surveys and military data collection. 51 The difference, according to this author, is to be found in how the data are used once collected. 52 Military marine data collection and hydrographic surveys are consequently not to be equated with marine scientific research and therefore do not need coastal State consent in the EEZ. 53 Zhang, on the other hand, questions such a neat distinction made by Pedrozo.
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Because of the difficulties encountered when distinguishing between these activities, Zhang concludes that any kind of data collecting "could be categorized as of the latter convention, stressed the similarities with the territorial sea delimitation as far as special circumstances are concerned, for often they are similar (exceptional configuration of the coast, the presence of islands or navigable channels), but omitted any reference to historic title, meaning apparently that the ILC was of the opinion that beyond the limited area of the territorial sea such instances did not occur. 2 ILCYB (1956), 300. The LOS Convention only refers to historic regimes with respect to water areas in two articles relating to the territorial sea (historic bays in art. 10(6) and historic title with respect to delimitation in art. 15) and archipelagic waters (definition of an archipelago in art. 46(b)). The latter, moreover, is only partly relevant for present purposes. 51 Pedrozo, above n.2, paras.18 -21. In the same sense, see J. Ashley Roach, Marine Data Collection: Methods and the Law, in: Nordquist, Koh and Moore, above n.5, 171-208. The latter author further distinguishes operational oceanography (ocean State estimation; weather forecasting and climate prediction) and exploration and exploitation of natural resources and underwater cultural heritage (ibid., 173). 52 Pedrozo, above n.2, para.22; Roach, above n.51, 197. 53 Pedrozo, above n.2, para.22; Roach, above n.51, 180 -181. 54 Zhang, above n.2, paras.12 -13. marine scientific research" leading to coastal State jurisdiction covering all these activities. 55 20. The participation of the present author in the Advisory Body of Experts on the Law of the Sea (ABE-LOS) of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO for almost a decade now makes it obvious that this discussion is not going to be settled here and now. ABE-LOS, a body in which lawyers as well as scientists are represented, has over the years learnt to live with this dilemma. Having been unable to overcome this particular hurdle, ABE-LOS has usually rather tried to reach practical solutions by consciously sidestepping the underlying fundamental theoretical issue of whether certain activities should be qualified as marine scientific research in the first place and therefore be automatically covered by Part XIII of the LOS Convention. 58 Answering a specific question afterwards as to whether military data collection can be qualified as marine scientific research, he gave the example of State practice of his own country, which does not seem to fit the principled positions of either Pedrozo or Zhang as described above. 59 Being a retired captain at sea who served in the Argentinean navy, while at the same time a oceanographer by formation, he proposed to release sonar data collected by military vessels into the public domain after a onemonth lead period, so as not to divulge information on the real-time location of the vessel in question. 22. The conclusion therefore seems warranted that this is not an issue which States will easily solve between themselves in the near future, 60 certainly not China and the United States. Zhang in her article places special emphasis in this respect on "the duty to have 'due regard to the rights and duties of the Coastal State[s]'". 61 But this is, of course, only a partial reading of the LOS Convention, for this particular provision has to be read in tandem with Article 56(2) of the same document, obliging the coastal State to have similarly "due regard to the rights and duties of other States" when exercising their rights, jurisdiction and duties in the EEZ. Instead of a one-sided obligation of due regard, this obligation is mutually applicable between the coastal State and the other State concerned, making the hypothesis of both parties finding a solution to the dispute themselves rather slim. 63 As concluded by Natalie Klein, since the LOS Convention did not fix any specific order of priority with respect to coastal and user States' rights in the EEZ, "it is only when due regard obligations can be subjected to third-party procedures that the possibility exists for these duties to have a meaningful application that would take into account the differing circumstances". 72 It consequently remains the cornerstone of the construction of the EEZ legal regime under the LOS Convention. 73 The argument therefore that the LOS Convention "has unequivocally excluded the EEZ from the high seas and incorporated in into the national jurisdiction of the coastal State" seems to be somewhat tendentious. 74 24. The heightened tension which marked the Sino-US relations with respect to the South China Sea during 2010 hardly seems to create the right atmosphere to induce the parties to settle their dispute concerning navigational rights of warships. Whether or not Chinese officials conveyed the message to senior Obama administration officials in March 2010 that the South China Sea was a "core interest" in China policy, like Taiwan and Tibet, and whether or not Hillary Clinton had stated at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July that the United States considered the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea a "national interest", were hotly debated questions during the Second International Workshop: The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, held on 10 -12 November 2010 in Ho Chi Minh City. 75 The fact remains that such a general climate is not conducive to reaching negotiated solutions between the parties.
25. Will third-party dispute settlement, suggested as the natural solution to these kinds of problems, 76 Whether, under present circumstances, they would be able to settle the underlying principal theoretical questions remains doubtful based on the preceding analysis. But in view of experience, for instance, within ABE-LOS, nothing prevents both countries from trying to reach practical solutions, without necessarily having to treat the underlying fundamental theoretical issues. This might be a first practical step forward, but even with respect to the latter, i.e. the underlying theoretical issues, it is submitted that there might be some light at the end of the tunnel. It can indeed be questioned whether the current dispute needs to continue to antagonize both parties as it does at present.
32. Even though Zhang strongly opposes any reference to the relationship between the former Soviet Union/Russia and the United States, in order to deduct implications for the present-day relationship between China and the United States, 90 the present author is nevertheless of the opinion that there might be important lessons to be learnt. Of course, the relationship between China and the United States comes nowhere close to the Cold War atmosphere which characterized the relationship between the former Soviet Union and the United States, 91 but navigational interests are not necessarily directly influenced by such considerations. 92 33. The first issue ever treated by the present author in an international legal journal concerned indications that the former Soviet Union might have been revisiting its policy of requiring previous authorization for foreign warships wanting to pass through its territorial sea. 93 Like China's declaration at the time of ratification of the LOS Convention, 94 the policy of the former Soviet Union had been clearly articulated by means of a reservation to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 95 However, as its naval capabilities increased and its interest as a blue water navy became more and more pronounced, the former Soviet Union little by little realized that its legal position, formed at a time when this country was only interested in keeping foreign navies away from its own coast, and thus determined by a pure coastal State perspective, needed to be adapted accordingly. This was certainly not an easy process, which occasionally led to confrontations between the different interested governmental authorities, but finally resulted in an official volte-face. 96 The changed Soviet policy found its
